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Executive summary
Despite significant investment in anti-corruption work over the past 15 years, most systemically corrupt 
countries are considered to be just as corrupt now as they were before the anti-corruption interventions. 
A growing number of authors argue that anti-corruption efforts have not worked because they are based 
on inadequate theory, suggesting that collective action theory offers a better understanding of corruption 
than the principal-agent theory usually used. This paper argues that both theories are in fact valuable, but 
both miss out an important third perspective, which is that corruption can serve important functions, solving 
difficult problems that people face, especially in weak institutional environments. Effective anti-corruption 
initiatives are so hard to achieve because they often require insights from all three of these perspectives.
• Corruption as a principal-agent problem: Principal-agent theory highlights the role of individuals’ calculations about 
whether or not to engage in or oppose corruption; the influence of transparency, monitoring, and sanctions on those 
calculations; and the technical challenges of monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behaviour.
• Corruption as a collective action problem: Collective action theory highlights the relevance to individuals’ decisions of 
group dynamics, including trust in others and the (actual or perceived) behaviour of others. When corruption is seen 
as ‘normal’, people may be less willing to abstain from corruption or to take the first step in implementing sanctions or 
reforms. This theory highlights the challenges of coordinated anticorruption efforts.
• Corruption as problem-solving: Corruption can sometimes provide a way of dealing with deeply-rooted social, 
structural, economic and political problems. Anti-corruption interventions need to better understand the functions 
that corruption may serve, particularly in weak institutional environments, and find alternative ways to solve the real 
problems that people face if anti-corruption work is to be successful.
Conclusion and implications
Each perspective—corruption as a principal-agent problem, corruption as a collective action problem, and corruption 
as problem-solving—adds to our understanding of the challenges that anti-corruption efforts face. They suggest the 
following considerations. 
• Effective anti-corruption initiatives will be driven by the context, not the theory.  Different perspectives on corruption 
may be most useful in particular contexts and circumstances. For example, principal-agent theory inspired interventions 
like monitoring, transparency and sanctions may have a big impact in contexts where corruption is relatively isolated, but 
in other contexts could backfire by increasing public perceptions that corruption is pervasive, risking inducing a sense of 
‘corruption fatigue’ among potential challengers and reformers.
• Collective action problems are sometimes deliberately crafted, and maintained to undermine the effectiveness of 
institutions meant to challenge corruption.
• Effective anti-corruption initiatives need to recognise and engage with the real political dynamics that underpin corruption, 
as well as to address the perception that corruption is ‘normal’, when it exists.
• Understanding the functions that corruption performs for those who engage in it, and trying to provide alternative 
solutions, are likely to be important first steps for any effective anticorruption intervention. 
• Coordinated action, such as that provided by a reform coalition, will be important in addressing corruption, so it may be 
helpful to consider how such a coalition might arise: the most pressing collective action problem may be not corruption 
itself, but the formation of a strong coalition that can coordinate efforts to tackle it.
Further research by DLP and the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre will explore the different contexts and 
circumstances in which each of the three theoretical lenses are likely to be most appropriate, followed by empirical case study 
research, to inform the development of more contextualised, and potentially more effective, anti-corruption programming.
1Introduction
In the past decade and a half, the effort to control corruption in the developing world has grown seemingly exponentially; it 
has attracted support from all major aid agencies and has inspired hundreds of reform projects, action plans, anti-corruption 
agencies and a growing class of in-demand experts. Depending on the source consulted, it has drawn anywhere from 
hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in investment (Sampson, 2010; Michael, 2004; Michael and Bowser, 2009; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2006), leading to what has been called the birth of an ‘anti-corruption industry’ (Sampson, 2010; Michael, 2004; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006). Despite this investment, there seem to be few successful cases where countries have significantly 
reduced corruption in this time period (Johnsøn, Taxell & Zaum, 2012: 42). In short, most systemically corrupt countries are 
considered to be just as corrupt now as they were before anti-corruption interventions were rolled out (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2006; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Hough, 2013). 
For a growing number of authors the wide-scale failure of anti-corruption programming lies in the inappropriate theoretical 
foundations that underpin its design. Anti-corruption programming is overwhelmingly influenced by principal-agent theory, 
which depicts corruption as occurring when public officials who have discretion over the provision of public services 
lack accountability. This emphasizes the rational choices that take place in individual incidents of corruption, assuming that 
corruption is ‘solvable’ with policies that can alter these individual calculations. Critics have recently argued that these assump-
tions are flawed, especially in systemically corrupt contexts, where corruption is best understood to be a collective action 
problem instead (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Bauhr & Nasiritousi 2011; Rothstein 2011; see 
also Marquette, Pavarala & Malik 2014). From this perspective, the application of principal-agent theory mistakenly assumes 
that there will be ‘principled principals’ in civil society and in positions of power to actively oppose corruption and enforce 
anti-corruption reforms. Instead, for these authors, systemic corruption persists because corruption is widely perceived to 
be the norm in such contexts, and individuals gain little from abstaining from or resisting corruption if they cannot trust that 
others will do the same. The roots of this insight are attributed to collective action theory.
In this paper, we do two things. First, we unpack this critique further. In doing so, we aim to set out how principal-agent 
and collective action theories have been applied so far in the literature on corruption and anti-corruption, and describe in 
more detail the critique made that the application of principal-agent theory ‘mischaracterizes’ the nature of corruption in 
systemically corrupt contexts, and the ways in which a collective action theory lens is said to better capture the dynamics of 
corruption in that context. 
We also advance several new arguments. First we argue that the application of collective action theory, thus far, to the issue 
of corruption has been both incomplete and narrow. In addition to the insight that trust and perceptions of how others act 
influence decisions regarding whether to engage in or to resist corruption, the rich collective action theory literature also 
highlights the potential importance of a host of other factors, like the salience of the good for the group and the feasibility 
of members monitoring each other in contributing towards the collective good. 
Further, we argue that once the scope of potential contributions from collective action theory is widened, instead of the 
two theories being diametrically opposed, as they have been portrayed, they prove to be in fact complementary, and even 
overlap in some meaningful ways. This is particularly important, given the growing development policy interest in translating 
this research into practical policy recommendations.1 
Our third argument is that, as they have so far been applied to the issue of corruption, both principal-agent theory and collec-
tive action theory share in common a ‘blind spot’. Both theoretical applications have framed corruption only as a ‘problem’, 
which has failed to recognise that, in some contexts and for some people, corruption functions to provide solutions to 
problems that they face. In acknowledging the social, political and economic functions that corruption sometimes serves, 
a different light is shed on why there is often a lack of political will to undertake meaningful anti-corruption reforms, in 
systemically corrupt countries in particular. Reluctance is understood politically as a way to maintain a status quo that works 
for those actors involved. 
Finally, it is maintained here that each perspective—corruption as a principal-agent problem, corruption as a collective action 
problem, or corruption as fulfilling important functions—has something to add to our understanding of the scope and scale 
of challenges that anti-corruption efforts face, and that leaving one perspective out hollows this understanding. Corruption is 
difficult to deal with not only because monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behaviour presents technical challenges (principal-
agent theory), or because when corruption is perceived to be ‘normal’ few may be willing to abstain from participating in 
corrupt exchanges or be reluctant to take the first step to enforce anti-corruption reforms (collective action theory), but 
also because corruption is the means through which many solve real problems that have deep social, structural, economic 
and political roots. We conclude with further thoughts on how future research can better explore how each theory could 
be used to better inform anti-corruption interventions.
1 See, for example, studies commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (Rao 2013; Rocha Menocal et al, 
2014), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Mungui-Pippidi 2011); and several papers by the World Bank (e.g., 
Gauri, Woolcock & Desai 2011; Keefer 2012; WBI 2008).
2A principal-agent approach to corruption
The predominance of principal-agent theory in corruption research has been clearly demonstrated by a meta-analysis of 
115 studies looking at corruption’s impact on economic growth by Ugur and Dasgupta (2011: 43). They found that all studies 
considered ‘adhered to an explicitly-stated principal-agent approach to corruption, or their account was closely related to 
that approach’. This means that the principal-agent theory lens shapes our very understanding of how corruption impacts 
development. It is no wonder then that, as Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) argue, the designs of most anti-corruption 
programs reflect a principal-agent understanding of corruption, rather than any other alternative view. 
The principal-agent approach finds its origins in theories of the firm, where the classic principal was the investor who had 
little confidence in the stockbroker. A principal-agent problem stems from two assumptions: that the principal and agent have 
diverging interests and that the agent has more information than the principal (information asymmetry). Due to asymmetric 
information, the principal is unable to perfectly monitor the actions of the agent, and so the agent has some discretion to pursue 
their own interests. Moral hazard occurs when the interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned, and the agent pursues 
their own interests at the expense of the interests of the principal (hence the ‘problem’) (Ross, 1973; Harris & Raviv, 1979).
Corruption is often described as existing in society as a double principal-agent problem. In the first instance, a political leader 
is cast as the ‘principal’; they are tasked with monitoring the actions of bureaucrats (agents) in order to keep them account-
able. Without the ability to perfectly monitor their actions, however, rationally minded bureaucrats use their discretion over 
resources to extract rents when the opportunity arises. The second principal-agent problem occurs when public officials 
(bureaucrats or politicians) are conceptualized to be the ‘agents’ and the public, more generally, as the ‘principal’.As the agent 
the public official is able to abuse their office and discretion over public services to secure private rents from members of 
the public, and the public is unable to perfectly monitor or hold public officials accountable (Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011; Bardhan, 
1997; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978). While one would expect that the latter principal-agent problem is more 
prevalent in countries where there are immense information asymmetries between the ruler and the ruled, even in those 
countries where there are well-developed democratic and legally enforced accountability mechanisms and a high degree of 
government transparency, the public is still unable to perfectly monitor officials’ actions and hold them universally accountable.
In either case, viewing corruption through a principal-agent lens emphasizes the rational choices of individuals that take 
place in discrete incidences of corruption. This focus implies that corruption is ‘solvable’ with policies that alter the degree 
to which principals are able to monitor and sanction their agents and the level of discretion given to agents and their 
individual incentive calculations. Consequently, anti-corruption interventions, guided by principal-agent models, have focused 
on reducing the discretion of civil servants, increasing monitoring mechanisms, promoting transparency in government, 
supporting anti-corruption civil society groups to serve as watchdogs, and strengthening sanctions on those who engage in 
corruption, so as to better align the incentives of potential ‘agents’ with those of their respective ‘principals’. 
However, a recent U4/DFID paper on mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption provides some pretty stark reading. The review 
found that ‘[o]nly in the case of [public financial management (PFM)] does the evidence clearly suggest that such measures 
reduce corruption’ (Johnsøn, Taxell & Zaum 2012: 42). In terms of public sector reforms (other than PFM), oversight institutions, 
civil society, budget support, donors’ own systems and multilateral agreements, all interventions in keeping with the principal-
agent model, the evidence of their efficacy is weak or fair at best. After over a decade and a half, and significant investment in 
both time and resources, this is fairly shocking, though how much of this is due to failed interventions and how much is due to 
gaps or weaknesses in the evidence base itself (e.g., an overall lack of empirical research on anti-corruption work in fragile states) 
is unknown (Johnsøn, Taxell & Zaum 2012: 42-44). One answer given to the question of why the record of anti-corruption 
interventions has been so poor is that anti-corruption interventions are based on a theoretical misunderstanding of the nature 
of corruption; in other words, principal-agent theory has fallen short in providing viable solutions to the problem. 
If principal-agent approaches depict the success of an anti-corruption intervention as a function of the abilities of principals 
to monitor and hold accountable agents for their actions, a lack of ‘political will’ of leaders to fully implement anti-corruption 
reforms is typically flagged as an explanation for the failure of anti-corruption efforts. The application of principal-agent 
theory to the issue of corruption has taken for granted that principals have the ‘will’ to serve the functions of monitoring 
and keeping agents to account. It is no wonder then that anti-corruption programming does not effectively grapple with the 
variable ‘willingness’ principals may have in holding agents accountable.
It’s a collective action problem, instead?
Several authors (e.g., Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Bauhr & Nasiritousi 2011; Rothstein 2011) 
have recently criticised the principal-agent view within anti-corruption policy on these grounds, as well as governance more 
generally (Booth & Cammack 2013). They have argued that, in certain contexts, corruption should instead be viewed as a 
problem of collective action, and that especially in a context of systemic corruption, viewing corruption as a principal-agent 
problem ‘mischaracterizes’ the issue of corruption completely (see Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013, for this particular 
turn of phrase). A classic collective action problem, according to Mancur Olson (1965), occurs when, even if it is in the best 
3interest of all individuals in a group (or across groups) to act collectively towards a common goal, group members do not do 
so; instead, group members find it in their individual interest to not contribute at all or to limit their contributions, ensuring 
that the collective benefit is not realised to its fullest potential. 
What impacts people’s perceived interests and calculations to contribute towards the common good has been the subject 
of hundreds of studies. One potentially important factor that has been highlighted is the influential role of perceptions of 
how other group members act, or, in other terms, trust within the group (see Seabright, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Elster, 1985, for 
examples). It is in this insight that the authors cited above root their application of collective action theory to the conceptu-
alization of corruption. The following, from Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2013: 456-457), typifies the argument made: 
In particular, the rewards of corruption—and hence the strategy any rational actor is most likely to opt 
for—should according to this set of theories be expected to depend critically on how many other individuals 
in the same society that are expected to be corrupt. Insofar as corrupt behaviour is the expected behaviour, 
everyone should be expected to act corruptly, including both the group of actors to whom the principal–
agent framework refers to as ‘agents’ and the group of actors referred to as ‘principals.’
Viewing corruption in this way highlights the collective, rather than individual, nature of corruption and the very difficult 
challenge that anti-corruption efforts face in changing levels of distrust in society and norms that reinforce persistent patterns 
of systemic corruption. There is much intuitive logic to this analysis, but collective action theory has potentially much more 
to contribute to our understanding of corruption and the efficacy of anti-corruption interventions than just the important 
role that a lack of intra-group trust plays in sustaining systemic corruption.  Collective action theorists have highlighted the 
potentially important role of several other variables in influencing whether a group acts collectively. 
So how does collective action theory apply to the study of corruption? While the study of collective action predates, and has 
developed significantly since Mancur Olson’s (1965) book, The Logic of Collective Action, its influence on framing the issue is 
still very prominent. Writing at a time when many scholars took for granted the idea that people will cooperate within groups 
and act collectively to achieve common goals, Olson’s work was a strong counterpoint, as it suggested that collectives would 
sometimes not realise their full potential, becoming caught up in a collective action problem. 
In his book, Olson specifically referred to the ability of collectives to work towards the production of public goods. These are 
goods that are impossible to exclude people from using (non-excludable) and where one person’s use of the good does not 
reduce the availability of the good for others to enjoy (non-rivalrous). Street lighting and national defence are often referred 
to as examples of public goods. Olson’s analysis has since been applied to other types of goods, like common pool resources, 
which share in common with public goods their non-excludability, but not their non-rivalry (Ostrom, et al 1992). Unregulated 
or ‘open access’ natural sites like certain fishing grounds, pastures and forests are commonly cited examples of common pool 
resources; a person’s access to a unregulated fishing ground is by definition not restricted (‘non-excludable’), but their fishing 
activity can reduce the stock available for other users to catch (‘rivalrous’).
Because both types of these goods are non-excludable, people who do not contribute towards their production can still 
benefit from them; beneficiaries of this sort are called ‘free riders’. The potential for free riding is at the heart of an Olsonian 
collective action problem. Viewing individuals as maximising rational agents, Olson argued that whenever a user cannot be 
excluded from enjoying the benefits of collective action, the individual incentive to contribute towards the production of that 
collective benefit is reduced. Put differently, people opt to free ride when they know their level of contribution towards the 
collective good does not impact their beneficiary status. Moreover, individuals feel less inclined to contribute towards the 
collective benefit when they know or anticipate that others will free ride on their efforts. 
The resultant free riding is the collective action problem. When some free ride, and others do not, the collective benefit is 
not provided to its fullest potential; of course, if everyone decides to not contribute at all, than the collective benefit never 
materialises. In the case of common-pool resources, where the consumption of the good by one reduces what is available for 
others, copious free riding can lead to the depletion of the resource, which harms all users in the long run. This phenomenon 
is commonly referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). 
Ostensibly, in using collective action theory when thinking of corruption, corruption is the manifestation of free riding itself, 
as the motivation for engaging in corrupt behaviour is usually depicted as coming from putting personal interest ahead of the 
larger group’s collective interest.2  The group’s collective benefit, in this case, can be conceptualised as being either abstract or 
quite concrete. In the case of the former, the choice to engage in corruption robs the group from having a ‘corruption-free 
environment’ or a good quality of government. According to Rothstein (2011), a good quality of government is one where all 
citizens are treated impartially, according to the established rule of law. A good quality of government is positively associated 
with a number of tangible health, economic and other social outcomes; however it also represents something more abstract, 
2 We emphasise ‘personal interest’ here instead of the more commonly used ‘personal gain’ because the term ‘gain’ suggests that op-
portunities to engage in corruption are pursued in an opportunistic manner in order solely to benefit participants (e.g., monetary 
gain, career progression etc.). ‘Interest’, to us, suggests something different. A customs officer who lets in cargo knowing there are 
illegal narcotics hidden inside may be incentivised by her personal gain, but she (and her family) may also be under threat by pow-
erful drugs lords. It is in her interest to turn a blind eye, regardless of whether or not she personally gains.
4which is a governance environment that citizens and (foreign) investors trust to be fair and reliable, and is associated with 
greater life satisfaction. Through this prism, the absence of corruption and the presence of an impartial government is a public 
good in and of itself (Rothstein, 2011).3  
In a more concrete sense, corruption is charged with causing the depletion of tangible resources, which is typical of a 
common pool resource. Corruption can lead to the bankrupting of the state or at least reduce its ability to provide public 
services effectively and efficiently. One might conceptualise the collective benefit here to be the percentage of the public 
purse allocated to the provision of services, and free riding—engaging in corrupt behaviour—as reducing or depleting the 
capacity of the state to take care of all citizens to its actual financial potential.
As noted earlier, trust/perceptions of free riding are only a couple of potentially important variables of the many explored in 
collective action literature. Agrawal (2002) listed more than thirty that scholars have identified as likely to affect whether a 
group will be able to overcome a potential collective action problem. While it is outside of the scope of this paper to review 
all of these, we present a smaller list of 11 in Table One; it draws from Ostrom’s (2010) list of variables most frequently cited 
in the collective action theory literature (see also Ostrom 1998, 2007). Ostensibly, each of these variables can be important 
to the issue of corruption, though some seem more readily applicable than others. 
The potential importance of any one of the variables listed in Table One is acknowledged to be completely contextual in 
the broader collective action theory literature (see Ostrom, 2010: 164, for example). Moreover, it is also clear that any one 
of the potential influences on collective action is most certainly impacted by the influence of others. This not only means 
that the variables’ interactive effects likely matter but that their own causal relationships to each other matter as well. For 
instance, trust or distrust that people will abstain from corruption is influenced by the heuristics people have formed about 
how others will behave in society, which are in turn largely shaped by one’s repeated interactions with others. Also, leaders 
with longer time horizons have long been assumed to be more ‘developmental’ (see Olson, 1993: 567-77; Clague et al. 1996). 
For example, the Kagame regime in Rwanda is said to have spearheaded the taming of corruption because it not only has 
a perceived long time horizon of holding office, but also because corruption is understood by the regime to be a highly 
salient obstacle to the country’s broader developmental goals and fighting corruption is key for avoiding a return to genocide 
(Kelsall, 2011; Chene, 2011).
The current treatment of collective action theory by corruption/governance circles may leave readers with the sense that 
collective action tends to equal inclusive community engagement, working with civil society to build trust in society and so 
on. A collective action approach to anti-corruption programming may involve these things, but Table One illustrates that 
successful collective action may be exclusive, exclusionary and hierarchical. After all, as noted in Table One, having a small 
group size is often seen as beneficial to finding a resolution to a collective action problem, and collective action problems 
are thought to arise when there is no clear and legitimate leadership that can regulate public or common goods. Moreover, 
collective action may also be influenced by particularised trust dynamics—trust extended selectively to those in close social 
proximity—rather than or in addition to generalised trust—trust in people generally (Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009:783).4  So 
it may be the case that the collective goals pursued are those that benefit a sub-group, like an ethnic group or clan, which 
could come at the cost of other members of a superordinate group, as in other citizens of the wider national group.
3 Hughes and Hutchinson (2012), however, challenge the notion that developmental outcomes should be thought of as a public good—
beneficial to everyone. They argue that even the most encouraging developmental trends—like the achievement of ‘good govern-
ment’—should be understood to be the likely consequence of conflictual political struggles between groups, where net ‘positive’ results 
often come at the cost of certain parties suffering, having to compromise their position and/or lose access to certain resources.
4 The wider it goes beyond a small group presumably the more it will depend on generalised trust.
Box 1: Integrity Pacts and collective action
Transparency International’s Integrity Pacts are arguably an archetypal example of a ‘theory-based’ collective action 
anticorruption approach. They involve written agreements between government and private bidders to refrain from 
bribery and collusion during the process of procurement bidding, and a monitoring system that provides for independent 
oversight from civil society over the public contracting process (Transparency International, 2009). In bringing all actors 
together to make a formal agreement, such exercises acknowledge that the most precarious risks for corruption often 
lie in collective dynamics. Consistent with the expectations set out by the literature on corruption and collective action 
theory, successful Integrity Pacts are built on trust within the group of actors involved (Transparency International, 2009). 
However, as the wider collective action theory literature suggests, (see Table One), the success of an Integrity Pact is 
often challenged when other factors are not also in place, such as: transparency of information and the ability of actors to 
monitor each other throughout the process of procurement bidding; continuity of actors with time horizons long enough 
to last the process of procurement (i.e. low public service turnover); and the political will of the government to be 
involved at all (Transparency International, 2009).
5Table One: How Variables May Affect Collective Action
Variable Why?
Group size In large groups, free riding is not easily noticed and group members may feel like their potential contri-
bution will not make much of a difference to producing the collective benefit (Olson, 1965). With more 
people, it may be more difficult to come to an internal agreement about how to coordinate activity to 
arrive at a collective benefit (Olson, 1965). In the case of a common-pool resource, more group members 
increases the chance of a resource becoming depleted (Ostrom et al., 1992).
Groups of a very small size may not be able to mobilize the resources needed to engage effectively in col-
lective action (Agrawal, 2000); larger groups have more resources to draw upon to aid the collective effort 
(Marwell & Oliver, 1993).
Group 
Heterogeneity
When some members have a much stronger interest in the collective good being produced, they may be 
more willing to bear the burden of others free riding to make sure that the good will be produced (Olson, 
1965).
Heterogeneity increases the difficulty and the likelihood of conflict occurring over coordinating and nego-
tiating the distribution of the costs and benefits of collective action (Bardhan, 1993; Hardin, 1982; Isaac & 
Walker, 1988; Kanbur, 1992; Banerjee, Iyer, & Somanathan, 2005).
Face-to-face 
communication
Face-to-face communication gives group members a more intimate interaction, which can be used to 
persuade others to cooperate or discuss grievances of past interactions. Promises made to cooperate face-
to-face are more easily trusted than those made by other means (Adolphs et al., 1996; Kerr & Kaufman-
Gilliland, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1994).
Repeated 
interaction
Repeated interaction between group members facilitates learning. Group members have the ability to figure 
out what strategies were successful or unsuccessful in garnering collective action. Moreover, reputations 
for whether group members would be willing to work collectively can be established through repetitive 
interactions (Schlager, 1995; Ostrom, 2000; Miller, 1992).
Trust / good 
reputations
Group members who feel that they can trust other group members to act collectively, based on a good 
reputation of past collective action or on something else, will be more willing to contribute towards the 
common good (Seabright, 1993; Ostrom, 1990; Elster, 1985).
Group 
interdependence
Direct and dependent linkages between individuals will likely increase the chances of collective action. 
When a person knows that their access to resources is dependent on others’ contributions and/or that 
others are depending on their contribution, they will be more inclined to contribute (Cook & Hardin, 2001; 
Yamagishi & Cook, 1993).
Voluntary group 
membership
If group membership is optional, then people will be more inclined to join groups that they already trust 
will work together towards the common good. Voluntary membership is therefore associated with group-
ings that have pre-existing higher levels of trust (Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Hauk & Nagel, 2001).
Heuristics / norms Through personal experiences and from other people, individuals learn heuristic strategies for how to get 
certain outcomes, and norms which attach a certain value to any given strategy or outcome. Depending on 
the heuristics and norms learned, they can either work to enhance a person’s willingness to forgo immedi-
ate individual goals in the interest of pursuing the collective good, or not (Simon 1955, 1957, 1999;  
Crawford & Ostrom, 2005; see Ostrom 2010 for a discussion on norms).
Monitoring /
transparency 
(contributions & 
collective good)
If contributions towards the collective good can be easily monitored, individuals will be less likely to free 
ride, out of a fear that their free riding will be detected (Ostrom, 1990). 
Monitoring could reveal that free riding is the norm and that the collective good is far from being achieved; 
if that is the case, then group members will be less likely to contribute towards the collective good.
Long time horizons Contributing towards the collective benefit usually means that individuals forgo their immediate individual 
interests for the long-term interests of the group. Thus, individuals who do not discount the future, or who 
have long time horizons, are more likely to be willing to contribute towards the collective good (Bendor & 
Mookherjee, 1987; Ostrom, 1990).
Salience of 
collective good
If the collective good is vital to group members’ livelihood or survival, then group members have a greater 
incentive to act collectively (Agrawal, 2002).
6Throwing the theoretical baby out with the bathwater?
Those that criticise the principal-agent approach to corruption and think that collective action theory brings a fresh insight often 
emphasise how these two approaches differ.5 For instance Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013: 450) tell us: ‘as a collective action 
problem, systemic corruption reveals radically different characteristics than predicted by principal-agent theory’. As such, they argue 
that it also demands ‘radically different solutions’. On two issues are these theories thought to differ. Firstly, principal-agent theory, 
from this critical perspective, mistakenly assumes that there will always be ‘principled principals’ who are willing to hold officials 
accountable for engaging in corruption; as discussed earlier, this is rightly not assumed in viewing corruption as a collective action 
problem. Secondly, unlike principal-agent theory, the application of collective action theory is able to make sense of the fact that in 
an environment where everyone is believed to be engaging in corruption, there are few incentives for individuals to abstain. 
There are some fundamental flaws with this analysis, however, which have implications for the development of these ‘radically 
different solutions’. Firstly, this is actually a misunderstanding of principal-agent theory, rife within the policy-oriented academic 
literature on corruption, in which principals are motivated not by principles but by interests. There is no such thing, in theory, 
as a ‘principled principal’. The problem in applying the principal-agent model to government is that (in principle) officials do 
not own public assets or have a material stake in them. This is why the response to the principal-agent problem is to find 
ways of creating (a sense of) ownership and property rights in public management, and aligning the interests of agents with 
those of principals.6 Principal-agent theory does not assume that (a) either the principal or the agent is principled (but does 
assume they have interests); or (b) the principal is willing to hold the agent accountable for not acting in their own interests. 
Put differently, it is not at all inconsistent with principal-agent theory to suggest that where principals do not have a stake in 
the intended outcome they will not be willing to play this role. 
Secondly, a collective action approach is not necessarily wholly incompatible with a principal-agent interpretation of corruption. 
In the first instance, both theoretical lenses describe the same individual calculations made when deciding whether or not to 
engage in corruption. Both theories assume individual rationality, whether that be bounded or not, and understand that people 
engage in corrupt acts only when it is in their individual self-interest. Moreover, both theories recognise that the decision to 
engage in corruption is shaped by the perceived likelihood that one will not be held accountable for doing so. In collective 
action theory, with corruption as free riding, the decision to engage in corruption is motivated by the free rider’s self-interest 
and knowledge that they will not lose their beneficiary status to a good (i.e. be held accountable) because they chose to engage 
in corruption.  Similarly, in principal-agent terms, the logic behind an agent being corrupt is understood to be a function of the 
agent following their self-interest and the perceived unlikely chance that the principal can hold them to account for doing so.  
A logical conclusion from both theories is actually that more effective monitoring and sanctioning can increase accountability and 
reduce corruption. Those that criticise the principal-agent approach to corruption downplay this. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 
(2013), for example, argue that the principal-agent framework has led anti-corruption strategies down the wrong path by 
implying that anti-corruption reforms should focus on reducing the discretion of civil servants, increasing monitoring mechanisms 
and strengthening sanctions on those that engage in corruption. These remedies are indeed tightly linked to the principal-agent 
vision of corruption; the inability of the principal to perfectly monitor and punish (or hold accountable) the agent for engage-
ment in corruption is at the heart of a corrupt principal-agent problem.7 It follows from the application of principal-agent theory 
that when the principal is better able to monitor or sanction the agent, the incentive to engage in corruption will be reduced. 
Arguably, however, similar conclusions could be drawn from some examples in the collective action literature. As Table 1 
suggests, several examples within the collective action literature illustrate that when group members’ actions are more easily 
and readily monitored, the incentive to engage in free riding becomes reduced (Agrawal & Goyal, 2001; Ostrom 1990). 
Institutional arrangements that increase the ability of the group to monitor and sanction individuals for free riding, while 
recognisably difficult to organise, are hypothesised to aid in the solution of the collective action problem (Ostrom, 1990).8  
In highlighting the ways in which the two theories overlap in their conceptualization of corruption, we do not mean to 
downplay the contributions of either theory. Rather, we suggest that, in different ways, each theory adds to the understanding 
of why corruption is sometimes so difficult to control. As Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) already argue, it is perhaps 
best to evaluate the utility of each theory’s interpretation of corruption dynamics as being context dependent. We would 
still caution against any attempt to view the challenges of anti-corruption through only one lens, regardless of context. In 
the first instance, even in systemically corrupt contexts, certain institutions may be relatively safeguarded from the types and 
5 Booth and Cammack (2013: 15) arguably emphasise their differences but do acknowledge that they are somewhat complementary: 
‘principal-agent analysis still has some relevance to meeting development challenges, but it must be nested within an understanding 
of collective action challenges, not the other way around.’
6 Paradoxically, perhaps principal-agent approaches could be most relevant to patrimonial systems. We are grateful to Richard Batley 
for this insight, among others.
7 There are other reasons, of course, why principals will not act, other than ability, such as ownership, alignment of incentives, organ-
isational capacity, capacity of agents to exercise influence and so on (see, for example, Batley and Larbi 2004: 62-65).
8 This is acknowledged by Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, (2013: 456): ‘collective action theories do not necessarily question the 
potential relevance of effective monitoring and punishment regimes as means to curb corruption’.
7extent of corruption that exist in wider society, and thus may benefit from a principal-agent theory inspired anti-corruption 
approach that emphasizes greater monitoring, oversight and higher sanctions. Thus, for us, it is important not to discard the 
usefulness of principal-agent theory’s understanding of corruption carte blanche, even in the context of systemic corruption.
It strikes us as much more useful to think about how each theoretical lens can complement the other’s contribution. For 
example, when taking into account different institutional and societal structures it may be useful to make room for an interlinked 
theoretical understanding of corruption.  One way forward may be to focus on what types of specific collective action problems 
influential principals face in deciding which anti-corruption reforms to pursue, as well as the challenges those principals face in 
implementation via their organizational agents. For example, in politicized bureaucracies recruitment patterns are usually rooted 
in clientelistic networking rather than meritocracy. There are a host of reasons, from a collective action theory perspective, 
why principals overseeing recruitment in a bureaucracy may not want to try to enforce reforms. They may believe that other 
people in similar positions are allowing un-meritocratic hiring, and therefore find some encouragement to do the same because 
‘everyone else is doing it’. Also, achieving a meritocratic bureaucracy may not be a particularly salient goal for them; as their own 
position is perceived to be subject to the political winds changing, they may not have a particularly long time horizon in their 
office. This will limit willingness to risk losing personal benefits from the status quo and/or exert energy to change things. Finally, 
the wider politicized organisational and even societal heuristics and norms may encourage them to allow this pattern of recruit-
ment to continue. These issues address why some political will might be absent to implement meritocracy based reforms; but it 
is equally important to note that these principals may also face classic principal-agent problems enforcing meritocratic recruit-
ment patterns, such as not being able to monitor closely enough the specific recruitment procedures their agents are following. 
Those having the ‘political will’ to reform would still find this limitation in their capacity to manage their agents a significant 
challenge to overcome before achieving a meritocratic bureaucracy. Therefore, depending on the situation, both principal-agent 
and collective action lenses highlight different challenges to anti-corruption.
Naidoo (2013), for example, argues that in several instances within and across South African state institutions, anti-corruption 
efforts confronted both principal-agent and collective action theory type challenges. For example, the lack of effectiveness 
of South Africa’s conflict of interest framework is found to be a function of confusion that people had around the ‘legal 
definition of remuneration’ and the fact that the financial disclosure forms did not require ‘full disclosure of all interests’, 
which are argued to be principal-agent type problems (Naidoo, 2013: 529). Additionally, several senior officials were indirectly 
encouraged to refuse to disclose, as they knew that non-disclosure in other cases elicited no institutional sanctioning, which 
highlights the collective nature of corruption risk assessments (Naidoo, 2013: 529). 
Similarly, with respect to public financial management, Naidoo (2013: 529) summarizes the findings of South Africa’s Public 
Service Commission. This found that negligence in enforcing regulations was sometimes encouraged by pressure from 
superiors and by the belief that it was acceptable or neglecting to act would not be sanctioned—arguably, more collective 
action theoretical type reasons—but also that there was an ‘absence of sufficient skills [within the bureaucracy] to effectively 
enforce financial management’, which is arguably a principal-agent issue. 
Finally, no fewer than 10 government agencies in South Africa were given a role in anti-corruption, which introduced chal-
lenges around coordinating efforts (a clear collective action theoretical issue) as well as the delineation of responsibility within 
and across the agencies (arguably both collective action and principal-agent type reasons) (Naidoo, 2013: 533).
The problem with viewing corruption as only a ‘problem’
Though we argue that, in a complementary way, each theoretical lens has something different to lend to the conceptualization of 
corruption, we also argue that in at least one of their similarities there is a crucial blind spot: as both have thus far been applied, they 
have questionably framed corruption as only a ‘problem.’ Doing so has failed to recognise that in some contexts, corruption and 
patron-client networks persist because they provide solutions to problems that some people face.9 In acknowledging the functions 
that corruption sometimes serves, confronting a ‘lack of political will’ takes on a new light. It becomes more than a mere matter of 
there being no one willing or able to make the first step towards reducing corruption, but instead conceding that the present state 
of affairs may serve purposes that seem defensible to those involved.10  To fully get to grips with the functions that corruption and/
9 A small body of literature from the 1960s and 1970s emphasized the potentially positive net effect that corruption might have on 
the economy because of its ability to ‘grease the wheels of commerce’ (i.e. speed up slow and inefficient bureaucracies to service 
the private sector) (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Leys, 1970). Our point is different to this one; instead of arguing that corruption’s 
net impact is positive, we think that corruption may be very harmful in most respects, but still persists because through corruption 
people find solutions to the real-life problems that they face. We make no claim here as to whether the ‘solutions’ people find in 
participating in corruption outweigh the wider costs of corruption for broader society.
10 Though there is not space here to discuss in more detail, this may also explain why ‘integrity management’ approaches – such as 
values-based training, improving codes of conduct and so on, often devised in less corrupt contexts and then applied in systemi-
cally corrupt environments, tend also to disappoint. Current research by the authors, along with Paul Heywood and Nieves Zuñiga 
(University of Nottingham) looks at integrity management systems in different contexts, with case studies planned in Bolivia and 
Rwanda, and another in Papua New Guinea under discussion. This research is co-funded by ANTICORRP (an EU FP7 programme) 
and the Developmental Leadership Program (see www.anticorrp.eu and www.dlprog.org for more details).
8or patron client relationships serve, we must start by better understanding the ‘real’ ideas and values behind these relationships, the 
functions that they serve and the resultant accountability relationships that actually exist. 
Because of structural political-economy factors in many developing countries, many leaders rely on corruption for political 
mobilisation and redistribution. Political leaders in most developing countries face a similar set of challenges in mobilising 
political support and maintaining political stability. Unlike their colleagues in advanced capitalist countries, who usually maintain 
political stabilization through legal fiscal budgetary transfers, the fiscal space in the budget available to political leaders in most 
developing countries for political redistribution is usually very limited (Khan, 2004; 2006; Herbst, 2000). Where there is high 
dependence on subsistence farming or informal sector employment, the taxable sector of the economy is often too small 
to serve as a source for redistribution through the budget (Khan, 2004; 2006; Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura, 1998). 
Moreover, because the potential political conflicts that political leaders in some countries have to manage are often deeply 
rooted in structural cleavages (Englebert, 2000; Hughes & Hutchinson, 2012), political leaders in these countries arguably face 
a more ‘expensive’ task of maintaining political stabilisation than others (Khan, 2004; 2006). 
However, polities do remain stable and politicians do consolidate and mobilise the needed support to maintain office, sometimes 
for decades, in this challenging fiscal environment. When achieved, political survival may necessarily depend on leaders using 
‘off-budget’ redistribution measures through patron-client networks—transferring resources to powerful clients in exchange for 
political support (Khan 1996; 2004; 2006; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Englebert, 2000). Put differently, through corruption, leaders find 
and redistribute the resources needed to make their political tenure viable, which, as a by-product, ensures the public good of 
a sense of political stability for society more generally. As Chabal and Daloz (1999: 103-104) write, ‘given that the state in Africa 
is not, and will not in the foreseeable future be in a position to garner the resources needed for an egalitarian distribution of 
resources according to social needs, (neo)patrimonialism continues to suit both patrons and clients.’ 
A similar argument can be made of the low capacity of weak state institutions, another common feature of most developing 
country governments. Unable to rely on defunct institutions to act as functioning political redistributive apparatuses, political 
leaders necessarily rely on informal neopatrimonial institutions for this purpose. Olivier de Sardan (1999:41) articulates 
nicely how these contextual factors—fiscal economic constraints and the low capacity of formal institutions—impact on the 
political opportunities leaderships have for mobilization: 
…in the context of a dysfunctioning administrative and bureaucratic apparatus, and a dramatic scarcity of 
resources, the multiplication of interventions in favour of one person or the other progressively becomes the 
normal mode of management of such affairs and cases.  But the omnipresence of ‘personal favours’ (though 
often liable to legal action, if the law were to be applied, and while remaining an undebatable constituent of the 
corruption complex) is simultaneously a functional necessity (conditioning the effectiveness of all administra-
tive undertakings), and a normative necessity (the foundation of all forms of sociability).
 Thus, it is no coincidence that arguably one of perhaps the best vehicles for mobilising more inclusive grass-roots collective 
action against corruption—programmatic political parties with broad-based appeal—are least likely to emerge in neopatri-
monial settings.11  Keefer (2013) explores collective action with regard to different types of political parties—programmatic, 
machine and patron-client—and finds that, in the latter, there is ‘little ability to act collectively. The central characteristic of 
patron-client parties is the exchange of support by individuals (“clients”) for narrowly targeted benefits provided by candi-
dates (“patrons”)’ (Keefer 2013: 10). Indeed, Keefer (2012: 6) points out that these sorts of relations produce leaders who 
‘favour low public good provision; high rates of private good provision to those narrow groups; and to engage in high rates 
of rent-seeking’. Under these conditions, it is difficult to see where a collective action solution to the problem of corruption 
is likely to emerge, either spontaneously or following external intervention.
The fiscal constraints of the state not only represent a challenge for political leaders but also for citizens, who, in a weak 
state setting, are often faced with the patchy and uneven provision of state services. Though hardly ideal, in this context, 
citizens sometimes view corruption as a solution-mechanism, meaning that for many the only way to gain access to services 
is through corrupt channels. Walton (2013) found this in Papua New Guinea, where citizens excluded from state benefits 
tended to think of engaging in certain corrupt acts as the only way they could secure social services. Walton (2013: 187) 
concludes: ‘in weak states such as PNG, some types of corruption can offer social protection mechanisms for those excluded 
from state benefits.’ A similar point is made by Hickey and du Toit (2013: 144), who observe that in the form of election 
give-aways particularly, patronage can work to reduce poverty reduction by offering the very poor some resource security. 
Of course, without the loss of state resources to corruption, there would eventually be improved service delivery; to those 
individuals who need to access them today – for themselves or their family – that is scant consolation.12  
11 This may be a good field for principal-agent approaches. In patron-client relationships there is a principal with an ‘interest’ (by definition 
with informal property rights or ownership), and the clients’ incentives are clearly aligned with those of the principal. The question for 
the patron is whether agents actually fulfil their obligations (e.g. to vote for the principal), and how they hold them to it.
12 A big question emerges from this discussion, and one that we do not (yet) answer here: is a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to corrup-
tion appropriate when it comes to service delivery when the alternative is not immediate access to (quality) services but rather 
no access at all? Does it make vulnerable people more or less vulnerable? This question echoes findings in Johnston and Johnsøn 
(2014) on ‘Doing the wrong things for the right reasons? “Do no harm” as a principle of reform’.
9For citizens, patron-client relationships and corruption can serve many social functions as well. For example, Gauri, Woolcock 
and Desai (2011: 27) observe that in Honduras, a history of violent conflict has shaped the way in which patron-client 
relations are viewed; rather than simply being understood as a way of (corruptly) accessing public funds, they are understood 
as providing security and safety in a highly violent and unstable environment. Moreover, participating in a network of patron-
client relationships can reinforce social bonds and societal norms that are universally valued like the notion that people in 
powerful positions should give back, and feelings of mutual obligation. 
Not surprisingly, the channels of corruption called upon for many citizens often involve those that exist within their inner 
circles. Nguyen (2009) tells us that in Vietnam, social networks are often used to figure out what hospital to go to when one 
needs to seek health treatment, who to bribe at the hospital and how much. Similarly, in Papua New Guinea, it is common 
to draw upon wantoks—friends, family or tribal members to whom one is obligated—to try to secure goods like medicine, 
money, shelter and food, sometimes through corrupt means, when the state does not provide them (Walton, 2013). Oliver 
de Sardan explains that extensive extended social and familial networks are usually relied upon to source state services 
through corrupt means in West Africa; ‘the circle of individuals to whom one feels obliged to render services is thus astonish-
ingly wide to call upon’ (Olivier de Sardan, 1999: 40-41).13  
As such, participation in corruption often involves a great deal of trust. This may seem to be a contrary point to what is 
argued by those that have advanced the argument that corruption should be seen as a collective action problem. For them, 
corruption persists because of a lack of intra-group trust (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). Indeed, several authors have 
found that societal or institutional trust and corruption are inversely related (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Manion, 2004; Xin 
& Ruden 2004; La Porta, et al. 1997; Moreno, 2002; Seligson 1999; Davis, Camp & Coleman 2004). However, Tonoyan (2003) 
reminds us that trust exists in several forms and that ‘particularised’ trust—trust between family, friends, and kin networks 
and between citizens and a national bureaucrat—is a prerequisite for the enablement of corruption in many contexts. This 
is as opposed to ‘generalised’ trust, the sense that everyone - more or less - can be trusted, a form of trust that Uslaner 
describes as being unique to ‘modern’ societies (Uslaner 2002: 5), and the type of trust that those advancing a collective 
action approach to the issue seem to refer to. As an example of particularised trust, Lambsdorff (2002) observes that only 
after a high degree of trust is established do guanxi social networks arise in China, which serve the function of facilitating 
corrupt dealings, while at the same time preventing members from being overly exploited (see also Schramm & Taube, 2002). 
The interdependencies of social networks used to engage in corruption shape cultural responses as well as the socio-cultural 
foundations that replicate corruption. Ekeh (1975), writing of Sub Saharan Africa more generally, argues that the interdepen-
dence of actors in the ‘primordial public’ morally compels those with access to the state to engage in corruption so that they 
can redistribute resources back to their interdependent networks. Similarly, of Papua New Guinea, Walton (2013) writes that 
corruption has been considered important for maintaining traditional practices, like gift giving. Even in societies where the 
popular discourse expresses intense frustration with the prevalence of corruption, many corrupt acts are considered moral 
and/or legitimate within the specific context and circumstances that they occur (Smith, 2007; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Walton, 
2013). Capturing this sentiment, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 107) quote an African proverb as saying, ‘whoever does not rob 
the state robs his kith and kin’. Looking at post-colonial India, Gupta (1995: 397) observed, ‘a highly placed official who fails 
to help a close relative or fellow villager obtain a government position is often roundly criticised by people for not fulfilling 
his obligations to his kinsmen and village brothers’. 
13 Survey research of African and Latin American respondents confirm that the politically and socially connected are usually more 
likely to participate in corruption (Peiffer & Rose, 2013; Rose & Peiffer 2013).
Box 2: Prison gangs as a response to institutional failures
The argument that institutional inefficiencies harvest undesirable social behavioural patterns in people’s attempts to solve 
problems that they face is not unique to corruption. A recent Economist blog by J.D. argues that the rise in gangs in Ameri-
can prisons can be attributed to institutional failures within the prison systems. Overwhelmed by a massive growth in the 
prison population in the middle of the 20th century, American prison officials became no longer capable of protecting 
inmates from violence behind bars. In response, inmates started to organize themselves into prison gangs, non-existent 
until the 1950s. As with corruption, J.D. (2014) argues that prison gangs work to provide a solution to a very real problem 
that inmates face; gangs ‘provide protection in prisons where officials often failed to do so’. The policy implications are 
clear : ‘Improve the way prisons are governed and those locked up inside them would become less dependent on the 
mob-rule provided by gangs. Make prisons less crowded and dangerous, and inmates would require less group protection. 
Gangs are a logical response to prison conditions; to reduce them, the authorities must improve the state of incarceration’. 
This raises important questions about whether corruption is a symptom or a cause of institutional weakness and, thus, 
how you treat it. In this case, breaking up prison gangs would not necessarily lead to stronger institutions because they 
are a ‘symptom’, and it is likely that other ‘informal’ remedies would (re)emerge. In other words, eliminating one form of 
corruption without strengthening the underlying institutions is only likely to lead to another form of corruption emerging 
down the line.
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The challenges for anti-corruption through multiple lenses
Those working within the principal-agent theory inspired anti-corruption paradigm often blame the failure of an interven-
tion on a lack of ‘political will’ to implement what is otherwise perceived to be a good technical solution to the problem of 
corruption. By stopping there, however, ‘political will’ is treated as a black box, exogenous to the design of an effective anti-
corruption intervention. If corruption is a collective action problem, as it has recently been treated in the literature, the black 
box becomes partly unpacked; from this perspective, a leader will lack the ‘political will’ to make the first move to implement 
anti-corruption reforms because they cannot trust that others will follow suit. The risk is that any first move is both wasted 
and not rewarded, or even that it could be punished. 
One implicit message from this analysis is that an effective response to fight corruption requires coordinated actions. This 
resonates well with observations made by others that episodes of effective anti-corruption action have hinged upon the 
presence of an anti-corruption reform coalition (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002; Klitgaard & Baser, 1998; Chene, 2010). Reform 
coalitions are coalitions of usually elite actors within and across the state, often with actors from the private sector and civil 
society that share in common overlapping goals. In this case, this means controlling corruption and actively cooperating with 
each other to achieve this goal (Peiffer, 2012; Johnston & Kpundeh, 2002). Johnston and Kpundeh (2002: 3) argue that anti-
corruption reform coalitions represent the ‘best strategy we have for creating a visible, legitimate [anti-corruption] reform 
movement quickly’. Reform coalitions are said to be particularly useful for their potential to moderate the costs and risks for 
‘those that take the first steps against corruption in the face of both popular apathy and entrenched opposition from corrup-
tion interests’ (Johnston & Kpundeh, 2002: 3); this is the very concern of those advocating a collective action theory-inspired 
understanding of the problem of corruption.  
The point made is not controversial: if transformational change is to occur, it will not rely on the action of one or a few indi-
vidual elites or disparate and small citizen groups speaking out against pervasive patterns of corruption. Even if they had the 
motivation to ‘stick their necks out’, in the face of systemic corruption especially, a collective and coordinated effort would be 
required. In accepting this mantra, the collective action problem that should draw our attention is not just, or necessarily, one 
of systemic corruption, but instead that of sourcing/harvesting a true anti-corruption reform coalition with enough capacity 
to coordinate efforts and make a difference. 
To assess the chances of a reform coalition arising, we must return to the black box of ‘political will’, and unpack it even 
further. Recognizing that corruption sometimes functions to ‘solve’ the political problems of maintaining stability, providing 
access to state services and serving as a mechanism for political redistribution in a challenging environment, does this. It helps 
to makes sense of why ‘principled principals’ are often absent, or rather why principals are uninterested (in the sense of not 
having a material interest) and agents lack incentives aligned with those of the principal. The ‘political will’ needed to enforce 
anticorruption reform is often missing, perhaps because corruption is (sometimes necessarily) relied upon to solve problems. 
This acknowledgement makes the political and social dynamics that give rise to corruption more visible. Political factors are 
ever-present in shaping the interests and incentives of leaders and citizens to engage in meaningful anti-corruption reform. 
Rather than simply being seen as venal and extractive, it also follows that patron-client relationships should be examined for 
what purposes they serve and what they mean for those involved, whether that be a source of social bonding, a sense of 
safety and/or how they might work to reinforce other desirable societal norms like gift giving and reciprocity. This is not a call 
to romanticize those relationships, but instead to point out that—as researchers, practitioners and policy-makers—we often 
wilfully misunderstand them in the drive to condemn corruption.
Finally, through an explicitly political lens we may also start to understand why certain collective action problems exist in anti-
corruption in the first place. Coordination issues, for instance, do not always arise spontaneously, as merely a function of the 
multitude of actors involved. Instead, for political reasons, collective action problems can be carefully crafted or maintained, as a 
way of undermining the effectiveness of institutions meant to challenge corruption. Revisiting Naidoo’s (2013) examination of 
anti-corruption in South Africa, he forcefully argues that due to political impulses, South Africa’s ineffective multiagency approach 
to anti-corruption, which suffered heavily from coordination issues, was maintained. To this effect, Naidoo writes (2013: 538), ‘more 
overt displays of intra-party political motives were shown to have thwarted efforts to both institutionalize robust and specialist 
anti-corruption capacity within the state, as well as undermine the effectiveness of South Africa’s existing multiagency framework’.
In many ways, the different lenses should be seen as representing different spheres of challenges that anti-corruption campaigners 
face in promoting effective interventions. Technically speaking, effective anti-corruption interventions must be designed to take 
into account potential principal-agent problems that may harvest individualized incentives to engage in corruption, as well as 
coordination (collective action theoretical) issues that might arise in trying to implement an intervention. Conversely, implemen-
tation, or rather the reluctance to implement a reform, is not only a potential collective action issue—no one wanting to make 
the first step—but also is likely to find its roots in the perceived or actual functionality of corruption. In other words, changing 
people’s mentalities or perceptions of their colleagues or wider society’s behaviour will not necessarily change the structural 
necessity for elites to use corruption as a mechanism to ensure political survival, for example, or for ordinary citizens to depend 
upon corrupt networks in order to access what services exist. In accepting the need to better understand this logic, especially in 
the case of systemically corrupt contexts, the combined challenges to control corruption admittedly become incredibly daunting. 
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Arguably, these challenges are naturally ordered, as well. The will to implement a reform should first be dealt with before time 
and energy is expended in designing a technically savvy intervention. This implies that the functionality of corruption must be 
understood and confronted head on. Truly effective anti-corruption efforts, therefore, may not even attempt to directly tackle 
corruption in the first place. Instead, the logical extension of our argument would imply that serious attempts to control 
corruption would have to start by trying to gain an understanding of what solutions corruption provides those who engage 
in it, and then try to deal in the business of providing those solutions through other means. To draw on an earlier example, if 
we understand that corrupt patron-client networks in Honduras are defensible to many because of the sense of security and 
safety they provide in a highly violent environment (Gauri, Woolcock & Desai, 2011), serious efforts to control corruption 
must address the rule of law and security, before or along with addressing individual incentives or other collective dynamics. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how principal-agent and collective action explanations for the persistence of corruption 
are not necessarily competing but are usefully complementary. When conceptualising corruption as a problem, the two 
theories emphasise different sets of important dynamics. Principal-agent theory’s take on corruption highlights the rational 
calculations made by individuals at discrete points in time in a specific type of hierarchical structure. While collective action 
theory points to the role intra-group trust can play in influencing individual decisions, it has more to contribute than just 
this insight. A collective action theory lens applied to corruption emphasises the fact that the same individual decisions on 
whether or not to engage in corruption occur within a wider society, rather than in isolation from the behaviour of others. 
Thus, monitoring, transparency and sanctioning—all variables that impact upon individual calculations of whether or not to 
engage in corruption—are also weighed against the potential influence of group dynamics that may impact on the likelihood 
of free riding. Collectively, the two theoretical approaches to corruption teach us that corruption persists in highly corrupt 
countries because it is not only difficult to monitor and therefore difficult to prosecute, but also because, when it is systemi-
cally pervasive, people may lack the incentives to initiate either countermeasure. 
When recognising that corruption persists because it solves problems, the ‘corrupt equilibrium’ in countries with pervasive 
and systemic corruption is not just depicted as a social trap—maintained and reinforced by low levels of generalised trust—
but as a political one as well. Together, all three of these lenses highlight the multifaceted challenges that anti-corruption 
reformers face. They imply that effective anti-corruption efforts need to not only target wide-scale perceptions that corrup-
tion is ‘normal’, but also that corruption may possibly serve an important set of functions. Corruption is often used as a tool 
by political actors across several contexts to win and maintain political office, and in some settings corruption is one of the 
only effective tools available for political actors to reach for.  Without recognising this and engaging with the political dynamics 
that underpin corruption, anti-corruption efforts will continue to fail. Thus, anti-corruption reformers should ask themselves, 
what functions does corruption serve as well as what obstacles exist to eradicating it? Arguably, without answering the first 
question, one cannot begin to adequately answer the second.
Most importantly our analysis suggests that effective anti-corruption efforts need to be tailored to context, which also means 
that investment must be made so that contextual factors are deeply understood, without prejudice. This is hardly an original 
suggestion, but it cannot be over-emphasised. The context should drive efforts to tackle corruption, not the theory or model, 
regardless of whether interventions are inspired by principal-agent or collective action theories, or something else altogether. 
For example, monitoring, transparency and sanctioning measures may have a big impact in contexts where incidences of 
corruption are relatively isolated; however, as Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) note, transparency efforts in an environ-
ment of systemic corruption could expose the fact that corruption is wildly pervasive, and this may compel people to engage 
more in corruption, rather than fight against it.14 Put differently, collective action theory-inspired anti-corruption approaches, 
such as values-based training or public awareness raising, should not be viewed as universally appropriate solutions to apply in 
all contexts. The lesson here is that we should learn from the history of (mis)applying principal-agent theory inspired models 
of anti-corruption to inappropriate contexts, where political will was missing to implement the fixes prescribed. 15
14 Ostrom (2010) puts forth a general framework linking several variables, which puts more structural variables like the size and het-
erogeneity of a group as impacting upon a core set of variables, like reputations and trust, which all have feedback loops and effects 
on each other and on collective action. ‘It is the combination of these variables that evokes norms, helps or hinders building reputa-
tions and trust, and enables effective or destructive interactions and learning to occur.’ (Ostrom, 2010:164). Moreover, it should be 
noted here that collective action literature has been methodologically limited in testing many hypotheses when it comes to large 
groups. The study of collective action has been dominated by in-depth case study or lab experimental research, yielding fewer stud-
ies that are broadly comparative in nature or that have examined collective action with respect to a large N scenario—i.e. the study 
of large groupings (Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, 2010). Moreover, studies with larger Ns tend to be limited in geographical scope, 
which can limit the generalisations one can make with respect to lessons learned (Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, 2010).
15 Another valid critique of the development policy-oriented literature is its lack of engagement with the wider organizational cul-
ture literature, particularly with regard to public sector and business ethics. Future research could usefully bring these literatures 
together. However, even if this were to be corrected, the lessons on the importance of context remain valid. As Rosen (2010:81) 
points out: ‘[f]or Afghans to understand corruption as Americans do more or less entails their having to experience the whole web 
of religious, social and economic concepts that Americans have experienced. That really is asking too much’.
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This paper provides a foundation for the next stage of the research, which will further explore the practical implications 
of applying both a collective action and a principal-agent perspective (as well as the insight regarding the “functionality” of 
corruption) to anti-corruption reform, by breaking down anti-corruption reforms, examining how different characteristics 
of corruption and context might be taken into account, and hopefully offering concrete propositions about how the anti-
corruption reform and programming agenda should change as a result of these insights.16 Moving forward, research will take 
up the task of unpacking these different depictions further. Instead of building arguments for how one lens out-explains the 
incidence of corruption over another, we will aim to further the understanding of the different contexts and circumstances in 
which each lens is most appropriate to apply. Our hope is that research along these paths will not only further the theoretical 
debate on the social and political underpinnings of corruption, but will be vital for informing the development of more 
contextualised, and potentially more effective, anti-corruption programming. 
16 This research will be undertaken by Liz Hart and Nils Taxell, at the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre/CMI, and will be published 
jointly by U4 and DLP in 2015. Following this, the team aims to roll out empirical research in a number of settings.
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